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A SECURITY PROOF OF CONTINUOUS-VARIABLE QKD USING THREE COHERENT STATES
KAMIL BRÁDLER AND CHRISTIAN WEEDBROOK
Abstract. We introduce a new ternary quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol and asymptotic security proof
based on three coherent states and homodyne detection. Previous work had considered the binary case of two
coherent states and here we nontrivially extend this to three. Our motivation is to leverage the practical benefits
of both discrete and continuous (Gaussian) encoding schemes creating a best-of-both-worlds approach; namely,
the postprocessing of discrete encodings and the hardware benefits of continuous ones. We present a thorough
and detailed security proof in the limit of infinite signal states which allows us to lower bound the secret key rate.
We calculate this is in the context of collective eavesdropping attacks and reverse reconciliation postprocessing.
Finally, we compare the ternary coherent state protocol to other well-known QKD schemes (and fundamental
repeaterless limits) in terms of secret key rates and loss.
1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2], in principle, provides the most secure form of quantum safe
cybersecurity, i.e., protection against a quantum computing attack. As opposed to post quantum cryp-
tography [3], which is based on computationally secure mathematics, QKD exploits the laws of quantum
physics to achieve, at least in theory, unbreakable codes. Since QKD was first suggested in 1984, many
advances have taken place; from theoretical to proof-of-principle experiments to field tests and even the
forming of companies.
Even though this seems like the end of the story there are still many advances being made in all of these
areas. To this point, in this paper, we look at creating a best-of-both worlds approach to QKD by combining
the beneficial practical aspects of the two main implementations of QKD: those using discrete variables
(DVs) [1] and those using continuous variables (CVs) [4, 5]. To be more specific, we would like to use the
simpler encoding and decoding methods from DV QKD but at the same time leverage the simpler and more
affordable room temperature hardware components of CV QKD.
Recently, the ultimate (optimal) limit for a lossy bosonic channel was discovered and is given by the
PLOB bound [6]. An interpretation of this result is that no QKD protocol can go beyond this bound without
a quantum repeater. In terms of key rate as a function of channel loss (cf. for instance with Fig. 6 of [6])
this corresponds to a CV QKD Gaussian protocol with reverse reconciliation using a quantum memory at
Alice’s side and heterodyne at Bob’s side [7]. In terms of implementations, below this optimal bound lies
the single photon BB84 protocol [8]. Both of these two protocols are in terms of the ideal case, i.e., perfect
sources and perfect detectors. However, when one considers the realistic version of these two (in the case
of DV QKD this corresponds to the decoy state scheme [9, 10]), both become remarkably similar in terms of
key rates as a function of loss; except for a slight advantage in key rates for CVs in the low-loss regime and
a slight distance advantage in DVs for the high-loss regime. In this realistic scenario, both the DV and the
CV QKD schemes sit below the PLOB bound. Ideally we would like to either: (1) find a (realistic) protocol
above these two protocols or (2) have a protocol similar to these protocols in terms of key rates but one
that leverages the practical benefits of both schemes.
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With that in mind, we consider a protocol first introduced in 2009 by Zhao et al. [11] that uses binary-
phase shift-keying (BPSK) of coherent states, |α〉 and | −α〉, along with homodyne detection. Unfortunately,
as one can see, the performance of this protocol is below that of the realistic BB84 with decoy states and the
realistic Gaussian modulation CV scheme. In this paper, we consider a ternary-phase shift-keying (TPSK)
of coherent states, |α〉i where i = 0,1,2, with homodyne detection. Here each of the three coherent states
are phase shifted in phase space by 120◦, cf. Fig. 1. One may ask the question, what is the motivation
of going from two coherent states to three coherent states? Or perhaps why not go to more coherent
states straightaway? In terms of the second question, this is easily answered by considering the Zhao et al.
paper [11] and our results here. The extension to three states is challenging enough, while the extension
to more than three states is a very hard problem if one wants a strong security proof like the one we have
given here. In terms of the first question, there are two possible ways to answer this. One way is that we
know that at some stage as one increases the number of coherent states there must be a point where it
becomes a close approximation to the full Gaussian distribution. So there may be a point where one may
not need the entire (continuum) Gaussian distribution. Another way is to consider the affect that decoy
state BB84 QKD has on ideal single photon BB84 and draw inspiration from there. Specifically, by increasing
the number of pulses from the ideal case of one to say three pulses gives a boost to both the key rate and
distance [9, 10]. So perhaps we can consider increasing the number of discrete coherent states from two
to three (and potentially higher) as a decoy-state-like extension of the BPSK-modulated CV QKD protocol.
P
Q
|α0〉
|α1〉
|α2〉
Figure 1. Phase space configurations of the ternary coherent state QKD protocol. Note
that each subsequent coherent state is 120◦ from the other one. Alice’s role is to con-
tinually and randomly choose from these three options and then send them to Bob who
performs homodyne detection on the incoming states by randomly alternating between
theQ and P quadratures. As is standard, the quantum channel is assumed to bemonitored
by the eavesdropper, Eve.
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In this paper, we introduce and rigorously prove the asymptotic security of a new ternary QKD protocol
based on three coherent states and homodyne detection. For completeness, we mention that other discrete
encodings for CVs have also been considered [12–15]. In the papers by Leverrier and Grangier [12–14],
they considered two different coherent state encodings (i.e., two and four) but in order to analyze the se-
curity they ‘padded out’ the states with decoy-like states that effectively resembled a Gaussian distribution
from Eve’s point of view. This is instigated in order to leverage previous Gaussian encoding security proofs.
Finally, in [15] a multi letter phase-shift keying scheme was introduced, where an N number of coherent
states can be used. However, the security proof only considered a lossy bosonic channel (i.e., no excess
noise). In contrast, we consider a bosonic channel with arbitrary noise. Our results here allow for the signif-
icant reduction, compared to Gaussian modulation protocols, in classical post-processing, random-number
generation, and classical-communication overheads. Furthermore, by keeping the benefits of CV hardware,
our approach has the practical benefits of doing away with single-photon detectors that characterize DV
QKD systems. Such detectors are only able to reach their promise of low-noise and high-efficiency only with
the addition of cumbersome cryogenics.
Outline. This paper is structured as follows. We begin by giving more background on the relationship
between discrete and Gaussian encodings. This is followed by a description of the steps of our ternary
coherent state protocol. Our main result is presented next and consists of a simulation of a TPSK modulated
lossy bosonic channel. We end with our conclusion.
Notation. In what follows, f ′ denotes d fdz and similarly for higher derivatives. Sometimes we explicitly
mention a function’s variable (typically f = f (z)). The symbol
df
= stands for ‘defined’. The von Neumann
entropy of a density matrix $A is H(A)$ ≡ H($A) df= −Tr[$A log$A] [16, 17] and it becomes Shannon
entropy for classical probability distributions (denoted by X ,Y in this paper). We will intensively study the
properties of H(X ) where X = ~x = (x1, x2, 1− x1 − x2) and so a special name will be reserved for it – the
ternary Shannon entropy:
h3(~x)
df
= −x1 log x1 − x2 log x2 − (1− x1 − x2) log [1− x1 − x2]. (1)
The base of the logarithms is irrelevant but will be set to two throughout the paper. The classical-quantum
conditional entropy (entropy conditioned on a classical variable) reads H(A|Y ) = ∑y p(y)H($yA). For
a classical variable A = X the entropy becomes the standard Shannon conditional entropy H(X |Y ) =
−∑y p(y)∑x p(x |y) log p(x |y). Other entropic quantities used in the paper include the classical mutual
information I(X : Y )
df
= H(X ) +H(Y )−H(XY ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X ). We will also use the quantum version of
the mutual information where one of the registers is quantum and express it as I(Y : E) = H(E|X ) + I(X :
E)−H(E|Y ).
When we say a function f is increasing we mean non-decreasing ( f (x) ≤ f (y) whenever x ≤ y).
Similarly, a decreasing function means a non-increasing function.
Conventions. We will use the convention of [11] for the quadrature operators. They are given by Q =
1/
p
2(a + a†), P = 1/
p
2(a − a†) and so 〈(∆Q)2〉α = 〈(∆P)2〉α = 1/2 (ħh = 1) and 〈Q〉α = 1/p2(α + α¯)
where α = r exp [iσ]. In our case we have (αx)x=0,1,2 and σ0 = 0,σ1 = 2pi/3 and σ2 = 4pi/3 and ri = r
is a free parameter chosen by the legitimate participants to maximize the secret key rate.
A lossy bosonic channel is a Gaussian channel parametrized by has two quantitites. One of them is the
transmittance 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 and the other one the number of thermal photons representing the Gaussian
excess noise. For the sake of comparison, we use the definition of excess noise from [11]:
δ =
〈(∆Q)2〉%B
〈(∆Q)2〉|0〉 − 1 (2)
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given by Bob’s measurement of %B. For the simulation scenario we also assume 〈(∆Q)2〉%B = 〈(∆P)2〉%B .
A quantity called a “mixedness parameter” "x ≥ 0 is upper bounded by Bob’s second moments according
to (65) of [11] and it is the main estimate of the state in Eve’s possession. In our simulation scenario we
may set1, " ≡ "x .
2. Discrete versus Gaussian encoding
The most studied QKD schemes are discrete-variable (DV) QKD [1, 2] and continuous-variable (CV)
QKD [4] based on a Gaussian encoding. The DV QKD security analysis is very mature but the secret key
rates are limited given the discrete nature of the encoding. Higher-dimensional DV QKD scheme have been
analyzed [18] but yet to have graduated from the experimental point of view. Gaussian CV QKD offers
much generous secret key rates together with a relatively simple experimental realization in terms of the
state preparation and detection. But it has also its disadvantages. For instance, the classical postprocessing
such as error-correction is computationally demanding and currently not very efficient. The aspiration of
CV QKD based on a distribution of discrete signal states holds a promise of combining the best of both
worlds.
Unlike a Gaussian encoding where the best adversary’s strategy is known, the same is not true if the
number of signal states is discrete. In fact, to the authors’ knowledge, there exists only one paper dealing
with the security of such a scheme without assuming nearly anything about the adversary’s powers [11].
The security proof (and thus the corresponding secret key rate lower bound) is derived by assuming a
collective attack and in the asymptotic scenario of an infinite code length. The collective attacks are not the
most general eavesdropping scheme. However, it is widely believed that similarly to DV QKD or Gaussian
CV QKD, a more general attack strategy does not bring any advantage. For the second point, an asymptotic
analysis is not a realistic assumption but it is historically the first step after which a finite-key length analysis
typically follows. The number of signal (coherent) states prepared by a sender in [11] is two and the
receiver is allowed to measure only the first and second moments of whatever gets through the (unknown)
quantum channel. Through a tour-de-force calculation, the authors essentially construct a statistical model
of the adversary’s quantum states compatible with the legitimate recipient’s measurement and maximize
the amount of information the adversary can in principle get, following a two-way public discussion. In this
way, a secret key rate lower bound is derived.
The analysis is achieved by splitting the secret key rate for a reverse reconciliation protocol into three
entropic quantities and upper/lower bounding them from the quantities available from the recipient’s mea-
surement. In this paper, we follow the same strategy but instead of two signals the communicating parties
exchange three coherent signals. This may seems like a small iteration but the opposite is true. We get
not only substantially better secret key rate lower bounds but also show the limitation of the approach.
The latter point is worth elaborating on. The proof presented in [11] crucially relies on the monotonicity
and concavity of the binary Shannon entropy as a function of the absolute value of the overlap of two pure
states (not necessarily the signal states). For two signal states, these properties are trivial and they are
not proved in [11, Eqs. (33), (34)]. The situation dramatically changes for three signal states. Essentially,
the result of this paper is the proof that these two crucial properties hold for the ternary Shannon entropy,
Eq. (1). Only then can the rest of the previous analysis be applied verbatim and that is precisely what we
have done. Once these two properties are proven, the rest of the proof follows exactly as in [11] only with
a few minor modifications which we will write explicitly.
There is a caveat, however. For two signal states, the binary Shannon entropy depends only on the
absolute values of the overlap of the signal states. For three states, the ternary entropy depends on three
possible overlaps and a certain phase. This wouldn’t be a problem if we needed to study the entropy of the
density matrix for the signal states only. After all, the participants are those who decide what symmetry
(and a probability distribution) the signal states obey and that could greatly simplify the analysis. The
1The variables α,δ,",γ used in this section should not be confused with those from Sec. A.
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problem is that at one point of the previous analysis [11], the purified adversary’s state (estimated from
Bob’s measurement) need not obey any such property and the state must be considered arbitrary. As it is
discussed in the first remark of Section A.1, in the presence of more than one overlap, the studied function
does not even satisfy the (suitably generalized) notion of monotonicity. This is not only surprising but it
also affects the applicability of the approach of [11] that we follow here – unlike the case of two signal
states, the proof strategy has its limits. Another consequence of our generalization is that unless a generic
argument for monotonicity and concavity of the suitable generalized entropy function can be found (taking
into account what we have just stated), it is most likely that a completely different approach is needed in
order to study discrete CV QKD protocols and their rates for more than three signal states.
3. Description of Ternary Coherent State Protocol
Here we outline our ternary (three coherent state) QKD protocol. It goes as follows.
(1) Alice prepares one of three possible coherent states |αi〉with probability pi = 1/3, where i = 0,1,2.
In Fig. 1, we have a schematic of the phase space depicting how the three coherent states are
placed, i.e., sequentially separated by 120◦. She then sends the randomly selected coherent state
to the receiver, Bob, over an insecure quantum channel. It is assumed that this channel could be
monitored by Eve. Alice repeats this step many times. Alice’s choice for the ith signal (coherent
state pulse) is recorded in the variable x i . Specifically, the labeling goes as: |α0〉 is x i = 0, |α1〉 is
x i = 1, and |α2〉 is x i = 2.
(2) Bob, upon receiving a sequence of quantum states, randomly performs homodyne detection thereby
randomly measuring the quadratures Q(φ) for φ = (pi/2,−pi/6,−5pi/6) of each of the coherent
states. A similar setup was used in [19] but tested on a specific eavesdropping strategy. Bob’s
measurement results are recorded in the variable yi . Note that Q(pi/2)≡ P in Fig. 1.
(3) After the transmission, the parties publicly announce the measurement quadratures. One of the
quadratures, say Q(−5pi/6), the measurement data is published which is used to determine the
extent of the adversary’s maliciousness. These data are subsequently discarded.
(4) The remaining data (which we denote as {~x , ~y}) will be used for the final key generation. For the
purpose of reverse reconciliation, Bob sends computes functions u(~y) and w(~y) and sends u(~y)
over a public channel to Alice and keeps w(~y) which is a discrete proto-key (partially correlated
with Alice’s discrete variable {~x).
(5) Classical post-processing procedures of error correction and privacy amplification are applied by
Alice and Bob in order to extract the final shared secret-key. This final secret bit string is then used
as a one-time pad in order to perfectly secure messages.
4. A secret key rate lower bound
In this section, we derive the lower secret key rate for the ternary protocol with respect to a lossy bosonic
channel. Mathematically the main results needed for this lower bound (and which are rigorously proven in
the Appendix) involve proving that monoticity and concavity both hold for the ternary Shannon entropy,
Eq. (1). We begin by defining the lower bound of the secret key rate K followed by calculating the individual
components of this bound which include Alice and Bob’s mutual information and Eve’s mutual information.
The secret key rate K is lower bounded as
K > I(X : Y )−max
%ABE
I(Y : E) (3)
Eq. (3) has its origin in [20] where the one-way private quantum channel capacity was established. The
lower bound also differs from [20] in several aspects. (i) The channel is a priori not known and is only
partially estimated by the measurements of the legitimate participants. The ambiguity in its identification
is an advantage for Eve – the optimization leads to the penalty on the amount of shared secret correlations
as if Eve used the best eavesdropping channel compatible with the measurements. This translates into the
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best channel purification %ABE held by Eve among all admissible ones in Eq. (3), see also Ref. [21]. (ii)
Our key distribution protocol uses reverse reconciliation where the classical communication (exploited by
Eve) is transmitted from Bob to Alice. This results in the appearance of the second term in (3) as opposed
to [20, 21] dealing with direct reconciliation. (iii) Finally, given the reality of the explicit quantum private
code described in Sec. 3, the RHS of (3) is a one-shot formula – a natural lower bound to a multi-letter
secret key rate formula. A closely related expression for a secret key rate was derived in [22] while focusing
solely on the security of QKD.
4.1. A secret key rate lower bound for a Lossy Bosonic Channel. The job here is to maximize the mutual
information I(Y : E) in order to find a lower bound on the secret key rate K . In an actual experiment, the
classical probability distribution must be measured to be subsequently inserted to the relevant entropic
quantities in (3). Following [11] we may simulate an actual link by a lossy bosonic channel. This is a
realistic model for the atmospheric CV QKD with homodyne measurement. Note that the complementary
channel is another lossy bosonic channel and it captures the effect of the environment or an adversary Eve.
As is common for QKD, Eve is assumed to control the channel and take an advantage of the generated noise
to hide her illicit behavior.
As we will see in Section A.1, unlike the BPSK case studied in [11] the entropic properties of the inves-
tigated density matrix depend not only on the mutual overlaps of the three signal states but also on the
overall phase, see the expressions for d in Eq. (13) or (14b). In the simulation scenario for a lossy bosonic
channel the phase can be computed as we will show now.
We will first consider the zero excess noise case δ = 〈(∆Q)
2〉α〈(∆Q)2〉|0〉 − 1 = 0 (a pure-loss bosonic channel).
The estimated quantities become simpler as the recipient’s detected states are pure coherent states and
similarly for Eve. The parameter " given by (65) in [11] is bounded from above by U ≡ Ux = 0 from (65).
Hence " = 0 and (66) together with (C17,C18) of [11] imply
|〈β˜i |β˜ j〉|= cu = cl = κ.
The RHS is given by κ≡ κi j = |〈pηαi |pηα j〉|. Inserting cu, cl into (70,71) in [11] we get
dl = du =
|〈αi |α j〉|
κ
df
= |γi j | ≡ |γ|= e− 32 (1−η)r2 . (4)
This quantity is the estimated overlap of the states going to the environment. As expected from the prop-
erties of a pure-loss bosonic channel it is the same quantity as κ with η substituted by 1−η.
We can geometrically interpret the product of inner products in (13) (or its special case (14b)) if ψi are
coherent states. Then the product
z01z12z20 = 〈α0|α1〉〈α1|α2〉〈α2|α0〉= e− 12 (c201+c212+c220)e−i2(A01+A12+A20) (5)
is written in terms of the sides ci j and area A012
df
= A01+A12+A20 of the triangle formed by the corresponding
three points in phase space. This is the interpretation provided by Lemma 1.
We illustrate it on the symmetric case c01 = c20 = c12 ≡ c of an equilateral triangle for δ = 0, whose side
squared is equal to c2 = 3r2(1− η) found in (4). From the new triangle side we deduce, with the help of
elementary geometry (essentially Heron’s formula), the corresponding area:
A012 =
1
4
 
4c201c
2
12 − (c201 + c212 − c220)2
1/2
. (6)
and consequently the phase: ϑ = 2A012 = r2
3
p
3
2 (1−η).
How do we apply it to the δ > 0 case? Here, the situation is slightly different. The effect of a lossy
bosonic channel is not only shrinking of the phase space triangle but also increasing the states’ variances –
environment (Eve) and Bob do not receive a mixture of three pure states but rather of three mixed Gaussian
states. Following the general procedure outlined in [11], where only the first and second moments are
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measured, the overlaps of Eve’s state figuring in our simulation scenario are bounded by (70) and (71)
in [11]. In that case, neither |γ| nor κ are overlaps of the corresponding pure coherent states. More precisely,
since Bob measures only the first two moments, the authors of [11] introduced fiducial coherent states |β i〉
on Bob’s side compatible with the measurement of the first moment. Then κ = |〈β i |β j〉| and as before
κ ≡ κi j = |〈pηαi |pηα j〉| for the case of a lossy bosonic channel2. This provides the same interpretation
for |γ| (Eve’s parameters estimated from Bob’s measurement) and the phase is then determined according
to Lemma 1.
The main object of study is a lower bound on the secret key rate, Eq. (3). Here we break down the lower
bound for the simulated lossy bosonic channel. The central role is played by the ternary Shannon entropy,
Eq. (1), where xk = tk + 1/3 and tk is given by (18).
Eve’s and Alice’s Mutual Information, I(X : E). Closely following [11, Sec. IV. B], to get a secret key
lower bound, the first quantity to estimate is I(X : E)< I(X :QE) = h3(~x(Z)) for xk restricted to pk = 1/3
and 〈Ψ iEQ|Ψ jEQ〉= Zi j = Z exp[iτ˜i j], Z > 0. As explained in the remark on p. 12, the restriction to |Zi j |= Z
is a necessary step for the proof strategy following [11] to go through. Then, from (18), we get the explicit
form of xk:
x1 =
1
3

1+ 2Z cos
ϑ
3

, (7a)
x2,3 =
1
3

1− Z  cos ϑ
3
∓p3sin ϑ
3

. (7b)
Denoting f ≡ fi j = F(%iE ,% jE) to be the fidelity of %i( j)E = TrQ[Ψ i( j)EQ ] we get
h3(~x(Z ,ϑ))≤ h3(~x( f ,ϑ))≤ h3
 
~x((1− "˜0)1/2(1− "˜1)1/2|γ|,ϑ)

(8)
where 0 ≤ "˜i ≤ ". The second inequality follows from the proof of monotonicity, Theorem 10, as a special
case pk = 1/3.
When restricted to the simulation scenario of a lossy bosonic channel, the parameter ϑ is a phase whose
value we determine with the help of Lemma 1. Before doing so, recall that for δ = 0 the lossy bosonic
channel merely “shrinks” the triangle representing the mixture of three coherent states in phase space and
the shrinking factor is 1 − η for Eve’s system (see (4)). Consequently, %iE are pure and Eq. (4) can be
interpreted as the modulus of their overlap.
Eve’s Entropy conditioned on Alice’s variable X , H(E|X). The next expression used for the secret key
estimation is the conditional entropy H(E|X ). It is upper bounded by [11]
1
3
∑
x
(1+ Vx) log [1+ Vx]− Vx logVx ,
where Vx =
 〈(∆Q)2〉%B 〈(∆P)2〉%B1/2 − 1/2. In the case of a lossy bosonic channel we find Vx = δ/2.
Eve’s Entropy conditioned on Bob’s measurement outcome Y, H(E|Y). The third expression needed
to be evaluated from the secret key lower bound is H(E|Y ) in (62) from [11]. In order to do so we have
to generalize the conditional probability distribution related to the action of a lossy bosonic channel. We
cannot simply take the derived expressions in [11] since for three and more signal states the states cannot
all be aligned with a real line in phase space. Instead, we introduce
p(y|x) = 1
pi(1+δ)
exp

− |y −
p
ηαx |2
δ+ 1

=
1
pi(1+δ)
exp

− |y|
2 +ηr2 − 2|y|rpη cos [φ −σx]
δ+ 1

,
2An insight provided by Saikat Guha.
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where y = |y|exp [iφ] and αx = r exp [iσx]. For three signal states we take the values of σ0,1,2 introduced
in Section 3. To simulate the channel we further use p(x |y) = 13 p(y|x)/p(y) together with
p(y) =
∑
x=0,1,2
p(y|x)p(x) = 1
3
1
pi(1+δ)
∑
x=0,1,2
exp

− |y −
p
ηαx |2
δ+ 1

.
Hence, for example,
p(0|y) = exp
− |y−pηα0|2δ+1 ∑
x=0,1,2
exp
− |y−pηαx |2δ+1  .
A straightforward generalization of the derivation of Eqs. (56) and (57) in [11] allows us to lower bound
H(E|Y ).
Alice’s and Bob’s Mutual Information, I(X : Y). The final component is the classical mutual information
I(X : Y ) = H(X )−H(X |Y ) calculated with the help of p(x |y) and p(y) defined above.
Final Secret Key Rate Lower Bound for a Lossy Bosonic Channel. Now we have all the ingredients we
need to find the actual secret key rate lower bound. It is expression (72) given in [11], adapted to the TPSK
encoding. It can be written as
K > log3−
∫ ∞
0
d|y||y|
∫ 2pi
0
dφp(y)
∑
x=0,1,2
p(x |y) log [p(x |y)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
I(X :Y )
−  (1+δ/2) log [1+δ/2]−δ/2 log [δ/2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(E|X )
− max
0≤"˜≤"

h3
 
~x((1− "˜)|γ|,ϑ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(X :E)
(9)
−
∫ ∞
0
d|y||y|
∫ 2pi
0
dφp(y)h3(~x(|γ|,ϑ, p(0|y), p(1|y)))
+
∑
x=0,1

"˜
3
1+ |γ|
1− |γ|
1/2∫ ∞
0
d|y||y|
∫ 2pi
0
dφp(y)
h23
 
~x(|γ|,ϑ, p(0|y), p(1|y))
p(x |y)
1/2
+
"˜
1− |γ|h3
 
~x(|γ|,ϑ, 1/3,1/3)

−H(E|Y ).
For ease of sight we identified the origin of the summands by the expressions in the braces. The main
technical result of this paper – the proofs of monotonicity and concavity of the ternary Shannon entropy –
participate in the derivation of H(E|Y ). The reasoning is nearly a verbatim copy of Section IV.C and the
Appendices A and C of [11] implying the conditional entropy to be a lower bound on the secret key rate K .
In Fig. 2 we present the main result of our analysis (applied to a simulated lossy bosonic channel).
We plot the secret key lower bound, Eq. (9), for several values of the excess noise parameter. Compared
to [11], we find better lower bounds as expected from the use of three signals states but also much better
threshold values where the rate is zero. It therefore supports the idea that to approach the high rates given
by a continuous Gaussian encoding, one would need only a reasonably small number of signal states. This
cannot, strictly speaking, be correct for the vicinity of η = 1. It is known that the ultimate upper bound
for the two-way secret key rate at the presence of zero excess noise is equal to K = − log [1−η] [6], a
quantity diverging for η→ 1. Clearly, for any finite number of discrete signal states d, the maximal secret
key rate for η = 1 is log d like in our case d = 3. Ref. [6] also provided an achievable bound (actually a
lower bound based on [7]) by taking into account the input energy constraint. This is depicted in Fig. 2
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Figure 2. Secret key rates as functions of loss 1 − η for several values of the channel
excess noise δ = (0,0.0004,0.001,0.005,0.01) (the pink dots). The black curve is the
ultimate achievable bound without an energy constraint for δ = 0. The orange curve is
an achievable bound for δ = 0 taking into account the input energy constraint [6]. All
curves are functions of the channel loss.
as the orange dotted curve for δ = 0. The ‘stairs’ on this curve are the consequence of a different optimal
energy (input state overlap leading to a different input energy constraint) shown in Fig. 3.
An important fact to realize is that even though we have only proved monotonicity and concavity of h3
for 0 ≤ ϑ ≤ pi/2⇔ " ≤ 0 (for " given by (17e)), it does not affect the secret key rate lower bound. The
optimal input energy falls inside the region " ≤ 0. The situation is also depicted in Fig. 3.
5. Differences in an actual QKD experiment
The real-world scenario introduces further complications. The channel may not be lossy bosonic (it may
not even be described by a stationary process for the duration of the experiment but we will avoid this type
of complications). For a stationary channel and in the asymptotic scenario the participants collect enough
statistics to reconstruct the channel to estimate the conditional probability distributions p(y|x) and p(y)
arbitrarily well. The same applies to the BPSK analysis from [11] but as we already alluded to, there is
more degrees of freedom in the ternary case. There are in total three overlaps in the form of three real
parameters for a general triple of coherent pure states and in addition there is a phase. In the simulation
scenario of a lossy bosonic channel the overlaps if chosen symmetrically by Alice (our assumption) and the
phase can be subsequently calculated as done in the previous section3 But in for an actual experiment we
3Note that similarly to [11] we not only calculate the entropy of the input density matrix but also of other, say intermediate,
density matrices in order to lower bound the secret key rate. Even there the three real parameters coincide (they can’t be interpreted
as overlaps, though, see below Eq. (6)) and the phase can be calculated for a lossy bosonic channel.
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Figure 3. The red dots depict the optimizing overlaps r for δ = 0. The black curve is a
boundary " = 0 of (17e) (ϑ = pi/2) given by r2 3
p
3
2 η = pi/2 (see below Eq. (6)) below
which the proofs of monotonicity and concavity exist (" ≤ 0).
can only assume the symmetry of a density matrices directly prepared by Alice. The states where Eve can in
principle intervene has no a priori symmetry which translates into their entropy to be dependent on three
plus one free parameters. As it turns out (see the discussion in Sec. A.1), the key property of monotonicity
of the ternary Shannon entropy does not hold in general and the strategy to lower bound the secret key
rate from [11] must be abandoned.
How do we overcome this problem here? If the parameters measured by Bob indicate that the incoming
states are not symmetrically distributed, the participants assume the closest symmetric distribution that
gives Eve the biggest advantage. One could be tempted to take the smallest of the three overlaps and
create a symmetric distribution based on it. However, as the example in [23, p. 10] shows, the entropy of
such a density matrix does not necessarily becomes smaller thus indicating more distinguishable quantum
states. So a better strategy to introduce a single overlap is called for and it will necessarily reduce the secret
key rate. But only this is the situation for which we can follow the proof in [11] once the monotonicity
and concavity of the ternary Shannon entropy is proven. The worst case scenario happens if Bob detects
only two states, that is, if the channel is so disruptive that it managed to merge two signal states to one
quantum state. In that case the secret key rate would be zero and it would probably be better to switch to
BPSK.
How do we recover the other free parameter, namely the angle? Similarly to the lossy bosonic case, a
triple of fiducial coherent states (|β i〉)i=0,1,2 with the same absolute value of the overlap is introduced. We
assume that the triple properly bounds the entropies as described in the previous paragraph, so that the
advantage is given to Eve resulting in the key rate reduction. Then we followed the procedure of phase
calculation described below Eq. (6) following Lemma 1. This is the right phase for the fiducial triple of
pure coherent states.
A SECURITY PROOF OF CONTINUOUS-VARIABLE QKD USING THREE COHERENT STATES 11
6. Conclusion
In conclusion, we introduced and rigorously proved the asymptotic security of a new ternary QKD proto-
col based on three coherent states and homodyne detection. The motivation for introducing such a proto-
col is to extract a best-of-both-world’s approach to QKD in terms of the encoding and decoding of discrete
variable schemes along with the practical hardware of continuous variable schemes. There is, however,
the downside that the security proof is very challenging compared to the results for Gaussian modulated
continuous-variable QKD protocols. We overcame this challenge by mathematically proving that two crucial
properties, monotonicity and concavity, hold for the ternary Shannon entropy. This allowed us to evaluated
a lower bound to the secret key rate in the collective attack scenario.
Other interesting avenues of research could include considering a four-state extension (if possible, or
perhaps using a different method), determining what number of signal states are enough to tend close
to the full Gaussian distribution and also a thorough finite-key analysis. This is a lively area of research
for many classes of bosonic channels where the lossy bosonic channel is an important subclass [6, 24]. A
measurement-device-independent (MDI)-QKD [25–27] version of our scheme presented here would also
be interesting as a way of ruling out side channel attacks.
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Appendix A. Full Details of Main result
A.1. Properties of ternary density matrix. In this section, we give the calculations needed to prove the
main results. To begin with, let
$= p0|ψ0〉〈ψ0|+ p1|ψ1〉〈ψ1|+ p2|ψ2〉〈ψ2| (10)
be a rank-three density operator where p0 + p1 + p2 = 1. The state $ takes on a different meaning
depending on where it is used. It can be an input density matrix a sender prepares in a lab in which case
pk = 1/3 and ψk are the signal (coherent) states with a chosen symmetry. Or, it can be Eve’s conditioned
state based on Bob’s measurement. In that case, pk are arbitrary conditional probabilities pk(x |y) and ψk
are pure states with no obvious symmetry properties [11].
Following the Cayley-Hamilton theorem, one finds the coefficients of the characteristic polynomial
det [$− x id] = f (x) = ax3 + bx2 + cx + d = 0, (11)
where
a = 1, (12a)
b = −Tr[$] = −1, (12b)
c =
1
2
((Tr[$])2 − Tr[$2]) = 1
2
(1− Tr[$2]), (12c)
d = −1
6
((Tr[$])3 − 3Tr[$] Tr[$2] + 2Tr[$3]) = −1
6
(1− 3Tr[$2] + 2Tr[$3]). (12d)
The last two coefficient become
c =
1
2
(1− p20 − p21 − p22 − 2p0p1|z01|2 − 2p1p2|z12|2 − 2p0p2|z02|2), (13a)
d =
1
6
− 1+ 3  p20 + p21 + p22 + 2p0p1|z01|2 + 2p0p2|z02|2 + 2p1p2|z12|2
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− 2 p30 + p31 + p32 + 3(p20p1 + p0p21)|z01|2 + 3(p20p2 + p0p22)|z02|2 + 3(p21p2 + p1p22)|z12|2
+ 3p0p1p2(z01z12z20 + c.c)

. (13b)
Note that $ in all its roles in the security proof if always a sum of rank-one operators. Hence the trace
quantities in Eqs. (12) are easy to find. An additional check was performed by calculating the quartic term
1
24
 
(Tr[$])4 − 6(Tr[$])2 Tr[$2] + 3(Tr[$2])2 + 8Tr[$]Tr[$3]− 6Tr[$4]
and was found to be zero as it should be.
We set the overlaps to be 〈ψi |ψ j〉= zi j = |z|exp[iτi j] and get
c =
1
2
 
1− p20 − p21 − p22 − |z|2(2p0p1 + 2p1p2 + 2p0p2)

, (14a)
d =
1
6
− 1+ 3  p20 + p21 + p22 + 2|z|2(p0p1 + p0p2 + p1p2)
− 2 p30 + p31 + p32 + 3(p20p1 + p0p21)|z|2 + 3(p20p2 + p0p22)|z|2 + 3(p21p2 + p1p22)|z|2
+ 6|z|3p0p1p2 cosϑ

, (14b)
where ϑ = τ01 + τ12 + τ20. The absolute value |z| and the angle 0 ≤ ϑ ≤ pi are not independent and we
will revisit the relation below Eq. (18) (see also Lemma 1).
Remark. It may seem that by setting |zi j | = |z|,∀i, j we limit ourselves to a special case of $. This is
indeed true. Quite surprisingly, however, it is the most general case for which one of the studied proper-
ties (monotonicity) actually holds. It turns out that the multivariable function studied in this paper, the
ternary Shannon entropy (Eq. (1)), is not monotone decreasing unless |zi j | = |z|,∀i, j in which case it
reduces to the standard single-variable problem. What does it mean for a multivariable function to be
monotone increasing/decreasing? This question is closely related to the existence of sets that cannot be
totally ordered (totality means that either x ≤ y or y ≥ x holds). An example is Rn for n > 1 which
is only a partially ordered set. To this end, one defines the componentwise order [28] of two n-tuples
(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ (y1, . . . , yn) iff x i ≤ yi ,∀i. A monotone increasing or decreasing function f : Rn 7→ Rm
then satisfies f (x1, . . . , xn) ≤ f (x1, . . . , xn) and f (x1, . . . , xn) ≥ f (x1, . . . , xn), respectively. The lack of this
property (namely not decreasing) means that the strategy outlined in [11] we follow here is simply not
applicable.
Coefficients, Eqs. (14), are used to get the eigenvalues of $. Following [29] (or Wikipedia for a quick
summary) we form
∆0 = b
2 − 3ac = 1− 3c, (15a)
∆1 = 2b
3 − 9abc + 27a2d = −2+ 9c + 27d (15b)
and define
p = −∆0
3
= α+ βz2, (16a)
q =
∆1
27
= γ+δz2 + "z3. (16b)
They are the coefficients of a reduced cubic t3+ pt+q the general cubic polynomial f (x) can be converted
to. The coefficients of p,q from Eqs. 16 are given by
α=
1
6
(1− 3p20 − 3p21 − 3p22)≤ 0, (17a)
β = −(p0p1 + p0p2 + p1p2)≤ 0, (17b)
A SECURITY PROOF OF CONTINUOUS-VARIABLE QKD USING THREE COHERENT STATES 13
γ=
1
27
(−2+ 9p20 − 9p30 + 9p21 − 9p31 + 9p22 − 9p32)
=
1
27
(3p1 − 1)(3p2 − 1)(3p1 + 3p2 − 2)≶ 0, (17c)
δ =
1
27
 
18(p0p1 + p0p2 + p1p2)− 27(p20p1 + p0p21 + p20p2 + p21p2 + p0p22 + p1p22)
≤ 0, (17d)
" = −2p0p1p2 cosϑ ≶ 0, (17e)
where we also summarized some basic properties based on 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1,∑i pi = 1. Then, the three roots
(the eigenvalues of$) are xk = tk − b/(3a) = tk + 1/3 where
tk = 2
s
− p
3
cos

1
3
arccos

3
2
q
p
√√−3
p

− 2kpi
3

. (18)
It is known [29] that
t0 + t1 + t2 = 0, (19)
t0 ≥ t1 ≥ t2 (20)
hold. Hence x0 + x1 + x2 = 1 as we expect from Tr[$] = 1 but x2 ≥ 0 is not satisfied for all |z| and ϑ. For
example, if ψ1 = eiϕ1ψ0,ψ2 = eiϕ2ψ0 then |z| = 1 and ϑ = τ01 + τ12 + τ20 = 0. In general, it turns out
that x2 ≥ 0 is equivalent to q ≤ 127 + p3 which provides a bound on ϑ given |z|. Indeed, for |z| = 1 the only
possibility is ϑ = 0.
Something much stronger can be said about the phases ifψi are actual coherent states (either the signal
states or the fiducial states we mentioned in the main text).
Lemma 1. The phase Arg[〈αi|αj〉] of an inner product of two coherent states |αi〉 and |α j〉 is a function of|〈αi |α j〉|.
Proof. Using elementary trigonometry we write
〈αi |α j〉= e− 12 (r2i +r2j −2ri r j cos [σ j−σi])e−i2ri r j sin [σ j−σi] = e− 12 c2i j e−i2Ai j , (21)
where ci j a side of triangle opposite to the angle τ ji = σ j −σi between the sides ri and r j and Ai j is the
triangle area (it is oriented since Ai j = −A ji). But knowing ri , r j , ci j , we can easily calculate the area of the
triangle and hence the phase Arg [〈αi|αj〉] = −2Ai j = 2A ji . Hence the phase is much more constrained if
ψi are coherent states. 
This trivial statement (we could also use the relation between sin and cos to get the phase) has inter-
esting consequences we exploited in Eq. (5).
A.2. Monotonocity of the ternary Shannon entropy. The following result will be a useful tool in the
course of our analysis.
Theorem 2 (Descartes’ rule of signs [30, 31]). Let p(x) =
∑s
m=0 an−mxn−m be a real polynomial of order n
where s ≤ n and an−m 6= 0. Then the number of positive real zeros (including multiplicities) is equal to V −2k
where k ≥ 0 and V is the number of sign variations of an−m starting from an.
Lemma 3. Let " ≤ 0. Then q(z) in (16a) is monotone-decreasing and concave in z ∈ (0,1) for all pk. It has a
single positive root z# ∈ (0,1) iff γ > 0 in which case q(z)≥ 0 for z ∈ (0, z#).
Proof. The monotonicity of q follows from
q′ = 2δz + 3"z2,
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since δ," ≤ 0. Because of Theorem 2 (or just by inspection), there is no positive root of q(z) for γ < 0
again following from δ," ≤ 0. There is one positive root for γ > 0 and it has to lie in the interval (0,1]
since q(0) = γ > 0 and
q(1) = γ+δ+ " ≤ γ+δ = − 2
27
+ 2p0p1p2 ≤ 0
valid for all pk. 
Remark. Evenmore straightforward is to show p < 0 in z ∈ (0,1) (follows from Eqs. (16a), (17a) and (17b)
by considering (p0+ p1+ p2)2 = 1). The equality p = 0 is achieved for z = 0 and p0 = p1 = p2 = 1/3 but in
order to have future expressions well-defined we will consider the open interval z ∈ (0,1) throughout this
work. Similarly, we find p′ ≤ 0.
It is useful to know the generic behavior of the central piece of the cubic solutions, Eq. (18). That is
uncovered in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let " ≤ 0 and
g(z) =
3
2
q
p
√√−3
p
. (22)
Then |g(z)| ≤ 1, g(z)∝−q(z) and g ′ ≶ 0 for z ∈ (0,1).
Proof. The bound |g(z)| ≤ 1 follows from the cubic equation discriminant
q2
4
+
p3
27
≤ 0, (23)
where the inequality is always true for the case of three real roots of a cubic equation [29]. This, on the
other hand, must be true since $ is a density matrix. Eq. (22) can be both positive and negative with its
sign always opposite to that of q(z). This is because 1p
Ç− 3p < 0 for z ∈ (0,1) following from Lemma 3.
A related useful fact is that for γ < 0 we get g(z)> 0 for z ∈ (0,1). Finally, by writing
g ′ = 3
p
3
4
2pq′ − 3p′q
p2
p−p (24)
and noticing that the denominator is nonnegative we only need to study the behavior of ν1(z) = 2pq′ −
3p′q. First, we find a zero root due to ν1(z) = −2z
 −2αδ+ 3βγ− 3zα" + z2βδ. The quadratic equation
−2αδ+3βγ−3zα"+z2βδ = 0 yields two other real roots and, in general, they both may lie in the interval
(0,1). Only when γ≥ 0, one of the roots is negative. 
Lemma 5. Let τ(z,n) =
p−p cos hn and n ∈ Z>1 such that p, p′ < 0, 0 ≤ h ≤ pi in z ∈ (0,1) and h′ > 0 in
J ⊂ (0,1). Then dτ(z,n)dz > dτ(z,2)dz in J.
Proof. We find
dτ(z,n)
dz
=
2ph′ sin hn − np′ cos hn
2n
p−p . (25)
The denominator is positive for z ∈ (0,1) but there are two competing expressions in the numerator. The
first summand is negative, the second one is nonnegative and so the overall sign may be hard to infer. The
inequality follows by observing that the nonnegative summand in the numerator of (25) remains constant
as n increases while the negative one is divided by n and so its overall contribution diminishes. Finally, sin hn
and cos hn do not change their sign with a growing n ≥ 2 and, conveniently, sin hn > sin hn+1 holds together
with cos hn < cos
h
n+1 for n≥ 2 as illustrated in Fig. 4. 
Proposition 6. The function t0 is monotone-increasing in z ∈ (0,1) for " ≤ 0.
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Figure 4. Properties of some trigonometric functions.
Proof. From (18) we get
t ′0 =
2
3
p−p(z)g ′(z) sin   13 arccos (g(z))p
1− g(z)2 −
p′(z) cos
 
1
3 arccos (g(z))
p−p(z) . (26)
Both denominators are non-negative (check zero). Since |g(z)| ≤ 1 and ran [arccos] = [0,pi], both trigono-
metric functions are nonnegative. So the second summand (without the minus) is always negative due to
p′ ≤ 0. The overall expression is thus positive whenever g ′ ≥ 0. But from Lemma 4 we know that g ′ < 0
can occur as well so let us assume that for the rest of the proof. For h
df
= arccos g we first observe
h′ = − g ′p
1− g2 (27)
and so h′ > 0. We now summon Lemma 5 and for it to be useful we show dτ(z,2)dz ≥ 0. The case n = 2 is
special since we can use the half-angle formula cos h2 =
q
1+cosh
2 (valid for −pi≤ h≤ pi) to be inserted into
τ(z, 2) =
p−p cos h2 and we get
dτ(z, 2)
dz
=
ph′ sinh− p′(1+ cosh)
2
p−2p(1+ cosh) = −pg ′ − p′(1+ g)2p−2p(1+ g) = − (p(1+ g))′2p−2p(1+ g) ≥ 0. (28)
The inequality (p(1+ g))′ ≤ 0 follows from p(1+ g) being monotone-decreasing since both p and pg ≈
q
p−3/p are monotone-decreasing (from Lemma 3 we know that for " ≤ 0 the function q ≶ 0 is monotone-
decreasing and
p−3/p as well and because min
pk ,z
[
p−3/p] = 3 thenp−3/p merely “stretches” q). A sum
of decreasing functions is decreasing which concludes the proof since according to Lemma 5 we have
t ′0
p
3
2
≡ dτ(z, 3)
dz
>
dτ(z, 2)
dz
≥ 0.

Proposition 7. The function t2 is monotone-decreasing in z ∈ (0,1) for " ≤ 0.
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Proof. Considering tk in (18) as functions of p and q, it is known [29] that t2(p,q) = −t0(p,−q). The
mapping q 7→ −q changes the sign of g (and so of g ′ as well, see (22) and (24)). The proof of Proposition 6
then goes through in the same way as for t0(p,−q) since the trigonometric functions in (26) remain non-
negative for −g and the proof “covers” both cases g ′ ≥ 0 and g ′ < 0. Hence, t ′0(p,−q)> 0 and we conclude
that t ′2 < 0. 
Corollary 8. The function t0 + t1 is monotone-increasing in z ∈ (0,1) for " ≤ 0.
Proof. From Eq. (19) we find t0+t1 = −t2 and because t2 is monotone-decreasing, its negative is monotone-
increasing. 
Remark. Notice that we do not claim anything about the monotonocity of t1 and indeed it in general does
not hold.
Definition 1 ([32]). A function is called Schur-concave iff it is concave and symmetric.
Definition 2. Let ~u be an `-tuple for a non-increasingly ordered sequence u0 ≥ . . . ≥ u`−1 denoted as u↓k
where uk ≥ 0. We say that ~u is majorized by ~v (written as ~u≺ ~v) iff
m−1∑
k=0
u↓k ≤
m−1∑
k=0
v↓k , (29)
`−1∑
k=0
uk =
`−1∑
k=0
vk (30)
is satisfied for 0≤ m≤ `− 1.
Theorem 9 ([32], Karamata [33]). If a function f (u) is concave then f (~u)
df
=
∑
k f (uk) is Schur-concave and
~u≺ ~v⇒ f (~u)≥ f (~v). (31)
Remark. The function f (u) = −u logu is concave in u ∈ (0,1) and therefore the Shannon entropy S(~u) df=
−∑Kk=0 uk loguk is a Schur-concave function. For K = 2, we obtain the ternary Shannon entropy h3(~u),
Eq. (1).
Theorem 10. The von Neumann entropy H($) of density matrix (10) is a monotone-decreasing function of
the overlap z as introduced in (14), for all pk and for all 0≤ ϑ ≤ pi/2 corresponding to " ≤ 0 in (17e).
Proof. The eigenvalues of$ are x0 ≥ x1 ≥ x2 and satisfy∑k xk = 1. From the discussion below Eq. (19)
we know when x2 ≥ 0 holds and so (xk)k=0,1,2 is a probability distribution. We will identify ~u = ~x(z1)
and ~v = ~x(z2) where 0 < z1 ≤ z2 < 1. Then, Proposition 6 and Corollary 8 imply (29). Since ∑2k=0 uk =∑2
k=0 vk = 1 holds (so (30) is satisfied) we may write ~u≺ ~v. Following Theorem 9 we obtain h3(~u)≥ h3(~v)
and H($)≡ h3 concludes the proof. 
A.3. Concavity of the ternary Shannon entropy. We now turn our attention to the concavity proof. We
start by a proving the convexity of t0 in (18) in z. To that end, we set τ(z,n) =
p−p cos hn as in Lemma 5
and study the properties of its second derivative
d2τ(z,n)
dz2
=
1
4(−p)3/2

cos
h
n
−4p2h′2 + n2(2pp′′ − p′2)
n2
+ sin
h
n
−4p(ph′)′
n

. (32)
To show d
2τ(z,3)
dz2 ≥ 0 we have to separately investigate several different cases. We will need a couple of
auxiliary results.
The proof of concavity will be presented for " ≤ 0. The next lemma is the only exception where " is
arbitrary.
A SECURITY PROOF OF CONTINUOUS-VARIABLE QKD USING THREE COHERENT STATES 17
Lemma 11. We find
−4p2h′2 + n2(2pp′′ − p′2)
n2
≥ 0
for p in (16a), h= arccos g for g given by (22) and n= 3.
Proof. Using (22) in (27) the inequality becomes
27(3qp′ − 2pq′)2 − 9(4p3 + 27q2)(2pp′′ − p′2) = (α+ βz2)ν4(z)≤ 0, (33)
where
ν4(z) = β(4α
3 + 27γ2) + z2(8α2β2 + 12αδ2 + 18βγδ) + 36z3αδ" + z4
 
α(4β3 + 27"2) + 3βδ2

. (34)
Since α+ βz2 ≡ p ≤ 0 we have to show that ν4(z) is nonnegative for z ∈ (0,1). Theorem 2 reveals a lot of
information about ν4 through its coefficients. Depending on the sign of " we find from (17)
monomial degree sign for " < 0 sign for " > 0
4 + +
3 − +
2 ± ±
0 + +
No matter what the signs of 8α2β2 + 12αδ2 + 18βγδ and " are there are always two sign changes. Hence
ν4(z) has two or none positive roots (for " = 0 the second row from the top is missing but still there can
be two or none positive roots). Let’s first assume " = −2p0p1p2 (its minimal value given by ϑ = 0). In this
case we observe
ν4(1) = 4α
3β + 8α2β2 +α
 
4β3 + 3(2δ+ 3")2

+ 3β(3γ+δ)2 = 0.
Since ν′4(1) = 0 as well and ν′′4 (1) = 4
 
4α2β2 + 3α(4β3 + 2δ2 + 18δ" + 27"2) + 9βδ(γ+δ)
 ≥ 0 the
point z = 1 is a proper local minimum. The expression ν′4 is a cubic polynomial. Hence it has three roots:
one of them is always zero and the greatest one always equals one (the one we found previously). The
third root can be both positive or negative and whatever its position is we want to make sure that ν4 ≥ 0
in the interval (0,1). Recall that according Theorem 2 there must be another positive root of ν4. At first
sight it seems impossible because if the third root of ν′4 is negative then the segment of ν4 in (0,1) must be
decreasing (ν4(0) = β(4α3+27γ2)≥ 0). Even if the third root of ν′4 lies in (0,1) it can be either a positive
local maximum or a stationary point. This is because we showed that z = 1 is a local minimum, ν′4 has only
three roots and again because of ν4(0) ≥ 0. So where is the remaining positive root? The only possibility
is that z = 1 is a double root. Indeed, by calculating the discriminant [29] of ν4 we find it to be equal to
zero. This means that at least two roots coincide. Hence ν4 ≥ 0 holds for " = −2p0p1p2.
For 0 < ϑ ≤ pi/2 the coefficients of the monomials of order 3 and 4 in (34) clearly increase and hence
no new root can appear in the interval (0,1). For pi/2< ϑ ≤ pi, the monomial order 4 coefficient decreases
but "2∝ cos2 ϑ is a symmetric function and we have seen that ν4(z) had no positive root even when " < 0.
But now " > 0 and so again there is no positive root which concludes the proof. 
Remark. The claim holds for any n≥ 3 but we do not make use of it.
Lemma 12. The function (pg ′)′(z) has a single positive root z∗ whenever γ(z) ≥ 0 and (pg ′)′(z) ≤ 0 for
z ∈ (0, z∗).
Proof. We calculate
(pg ′)′ = 3
p
3
8
q(9p′2 − 6pp′′) + 4p(−2p′q′ + pq′′)p−pp2 . (35)
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The position of the positive roots is unaffected by the numerical prefactors or by the denominator. Hence,
we rewrite only the numerator ν2(z) = q(9p′2−6pp′′)+4p(−2p′q′+pq′′) in terms of Eqs. (16a) and (16b):
ν2(z) = −12αβ"z3 +
 
24β2γ− 28αβδ z2 + 24α2"z + 8α2δ− 12αβγ. (36)
Given α,β ,δ," ≤ 0 and γ > 0 there is only one sign change if 8α2δ− 12αβγ ≤ 0. This is indeed satisfied
for γ > 0. The observation
lim
z→+∞ [(pg
′)′] = +∞
concludes the proof. 
Remark. In fact, we can refine the previous lemma by calculating
lim
z→0 [(pg
′)′] = −3
2
p
3

− 1
α
3/2
(2αδ− 3βγ)≤ 0
and expressing ν2(z) with the help of (17) and
∑
i pi = 1 as
ν2(1) =
8
9
 
p40 + 2p
3
0(−1+ p1) + (−1+ p1)2p21 + p0p1(−1− p1 + 2p21) + p20(1− p1 + 3p21)
≥ 0. (37)
Therefore, z∗ ∈ (0,1). The minimum on the RHS is achieved for p0 = p1 = p2 = 1/3.
Lemma 13. The function (ph′)′(z) has a single positive root for z ∈ (0,1) whenever γ≥ 0 and for all " ≤ 0.
Proof. We write
(ph′)′ = − gpg ′ + (1− g2)(pg ′)′
(1− g2)3/2 (38)
and after inserting Eqs. (24), (22) and
g ′′(z) =
3
p
3
 
4p(pq′′ − 3p′q′) + 3q(5p′2 − 2pp′′)
8(−p)−3/2p5 (39)
we get an expression whose numerator reads
ν5 = −81q3p′′ + 54q2
 
p′q′ + pq′′

+ q
 −12p3p′′ + 18p2p′2 − 54pq′2+ 8p4q′′ − 16p3p′q′ (40)
and whose denominator is negative in (0,1). By inserting Eqs. (16) we get a daunting polynomial of degree
seven:
ν5 = z
7
 −24αβ3" − 162α"3 − 54βδ2"+ z6  −56αβ3δ− 378αδ"2 + 48β4γ+ 324βγ"2 − 54βδ3
+ z5
 
324βγδ" − 324αδ2"+ z4  −96α2β2δ+ 72αβ3γ+ 162αγ"2 − 108αδ3 − 54βγδ2
+ z3
 
72α3β" + 216αγδ" + 162βγ2"

+ z2
 −24α3βδ− 162βγ2δ+ z  48α4" + 324αγ2"
+ 16α4δ− 24α3βγ+ 108αγ2δ− 162βγ3. (41)
Let us first assume " = −2p0p1p2 which is the minimal value given by ϑ = 0. Then, there is an inflection
point at z = 1: ν′5(1) = ν′′5 (1) = 0. This indicates a triple root (corroborated by the zero discriminant
indicating multiple roots) and so
ν5 = f4(z − 1)3, (42)
where f4 =
∑4
i=0 aiz
i . By comparing the coefficients with (41) we deduce the coefficient ai and get
f4 = −6z4"
 
4αβ3 + 27α"2 + 9βδ2

+ 2z3
 −4αβ3(7δ+ 9")− 27α"2(7δ+ 9") + 24β4γ− 27β(−6γ"2 +δ3 + 3δ2")
− 6z2(4α3 + 27γ2)(α(4δ+ 6")− β(6γ+δ))
− 6z(4α3 + 27γ2)(2α(δ+ ")− 3βγ)
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− 2(4α3 + 27γ2)(2αδ− 3βγ). (43)
With the help of the following table
monomial degree sign
4 −
3 ?
2 +
1 +
0 +
Theorem 2 reveals that there is only one positive root. Note that the degree three coefficient of (43)
seems too complicated to analytically deduce its sign but our ignorance does not affect the number of
sign variations. Now we show that by for any " ≤ 0 the single root shifts and the inflection disappears. We
inspect the coefficients of (41) where " appears. Considering γ≥ 0, the ones accompanying the monomials
z, z3 and z5 satisfy
48α4" + 324αγ2" ≤ 0, (44a)
72α3β" + 216αγδ" + 162βγ2" ≤ 0, (44b)
324βγδ" − 324αδ2" ≤ 0. (44c)
Hence an increase of " from its minimal values to any " ≤ 0 will not add a new root in (0,1). Similarly for
the z7 coefficient "(−24αβ3 − 162α"2 − 54βδ2) which, due to
− 24αβ3 − 162α"2 − 54βδ2 ≥ 0 (45)
(valid only for the minimal "), is an increasing function of " ≤ 0. This is because α ≤ 0 and so (45) is
a decreasing function of " ≤ 0 ((45) can become negative). Even if (45) does not change the sign, the
z7 coefficient will always be greater than the one with the minimal " because the overall multiplication
by " ≤ 0 swaps the sign (and so the order). Finally, the z4 and z6 coefficients contain negative factors
accompanying "2 (recall α,β ,δ ≤ 0 and γ ≥ 0 by assumption). Hence, as "2 decreases, it effectively
increases the coefficients of z4 and z6. We can conclude that no new root for z ∈ (0,1) appears for " ≤ 0. 
Proposition 14. The following relations hold:
q ≥ 0 g ≤ 0 (pg ′)′ ≤ 0
(ph′)′ ≥ 0
Lemma 4 (i)
(ii)
Proof.
(i) The sought after implication can be reformulated in the language of Lemma 3 and 12 as z# ≤ z∗ since
q ≥ 0 in (0, z#) and (pg ′)′ ≤ 0 in (0, z∗). We proceed by setting q = 0 and, conveniently, the numerator
of (35) simplifies to
ν2(z)

q=0∝−2p′q′ + pq′′ = 6β"z3 + 6βδz2 − 6α"z − 2αδ. (46)
We ignored the factor 4p as it does not affect the position of the roots for q = 0. In principle we just need
to compare the position of the roots for the polynomials q and ν2(z)|q=0. However, they are both cubic
polynomials and the roots’ form is too complicated to determine their relation. It follows from Lemma 3,
Lemma 12 and the previous remark that the polynomials intersect at a single point in the interval (z#, z∗) ⊂
(0,1) and, in addition, the position of the intersection point above or below the x axis informs us about the
relation of the two roots. It would not be very helpful to set q = ν2(z)|q=0 and solve for z, though. It again
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leads to a cubic equation and we face a similar problem as before. The trick we will use is the following
transformation:
q(z) 7→ q˜(z) = −6βq = −6βγ− 6βδz2 − 6β"z3. (47)
The new function q˜(z) has the same properties as q(z) uncovered in Lemma 4 (the minus sign reverses the
negative sign of β). By setting q˜ = ν2(z)|q=0 we obtain another cubic equation
µ˜(z) = 2µ(z) = 2
 
6β"z3 + 6βδz2 − 3α"z −αδ+ 3βγ= 0. (48)
Its (single) root in (0,1) reveals where q˜ and ν2(z)|q=0 intersect but that also means that by comparing the
roots’ position of µ (or µ˜) with ν2(z)|q=0 in the interval (0,1) we learn whether q˜ and ν2(z)|q=0 intersected
above or below the x axis. So by setting µ(z) = ν2(z)|q=0 we crucially get a linear equation whose solution
reads
z` =
−αδ− 3βγ
3α"
. (49)
By inserting it back to ν2(z)|q=0 we get
ν2(z`)|q=0 = 2β
 
α3(27γ"2 + 2δ3) + 9α2βγδ2 − 27β3γ3
9α3"2
. (50)
It remains to show ν2(z`)|q=0 ≤ 0 in order to prove z# ≤ z∗. Since α,β ≤ 0 it suffices to show that
ν3(z) = α3
 
27γ"2 + 2δ3

+ 9α2βγδ2 − 27β3γ3 ≤ 0. Using (17) and ∑i pi = 1 we find ν3(z) df= 127 f1 f2
where
f1 =
 
p0 + 2p
3
0 + 3p
2
0(−1+ p1)− 3p0p21 + p1(−1+ 3p1 − 2p21)
2
, (51a)
f2 = 4p
6
0 + 12p
5
0(−1+ p1) + p40(13− 27p1 + 24p21) + p30(−6+ 20p1 − 42p21 + 28p31)
+ p20(1− 5p1 + 24p21 − 42p31 + 24p41) + p21(1− 3p1 + 2p21)2 + p0p21(−5+ 20p1 − 27p21 + 12p31). (51b)
Since f1 ≥ 0, we have to show f2 ≤ 0. We reduced the problem to a task analytically solvable by Mathe-
matica. Indeed, we find max [ f2] = 0 subject to γ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ z` ≤ 1. The first inequality is a necessary
condition for the initial assumption q ≥ 0 in z ∈ (0, z#) via Lemma 3. Achieving the maximum implies
ν3 = 0 which in turn implies ν2(z`)|q=0 = 0 (from (50)) and so µ(z`) = 0 (see above (49)). This finally
leads to ν2(z`)|q=0 = q˜(z`) = 0= q(z`) and so z#` = z∗` which concludes the proof.
(ii) Assuming γ ≥ 0 as a necessary condition to the current case of interest q ≥ 0 (g ≤ 0) for z ∈ (0, z#)
(see Lemma 3 and 4) we find ν5(0) = 2(4α3 + 27γ2)(2αδ − 3βγ) ≤ 0 (the different sign in the bottom
of the table on page 19 is due to f4 being multiplied by (z − 1)3) and so (ph′)′(0) ≥ 0. This is because
(ph′)′ ∝ −ν5. We also notice that (ph′)′ ≥ 0 for g = 0. This follows from Eq. (38) implying that in this
case (ph′)′ = −(pg ′)′. But from item (i) of the current lemma we know that (pg ′)′ ≤ 0 for g ≤ 0. Inevitably,
the only positive root of (ph′)′ occurs for g ≥ 0, that is, as long as g ≤ 0 we get (ph′)′ ≥ 0 as we wanted to
show. 
Remark. Note that (ph′)′(0)≥ 0 does not contradict g ′(0) = 0we found in Lemma 4. This could be hastily
concluded by looking at Eq. (27). But it is true only if g ′ = 0 and
p
1− g2 6= 0. In many cases it is found,
however, that for z = 0 one gets g ′ =
p
1− g2 = 0 and limz→0+ h′ 6= 0.
Lemma 15. Let h= arccos g and (ph′)′ ≤ 0. Then
cos
h
2
−4p2h′2 + 32(2pp′′ − p′2)
4× 32(−p)3/2 + sin
h
2
−p(ph′)′
3(−p)3/2 ≥ 0 (52)
whenever g ≥ 0 and for all " ≤ 0.
Remark. The expression resembles part of Eq. (32). However, notice n = 2 in the trigonometric functions
and n= 3 elsewhere.
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Proof. Given τ(z,n) =
p−p cos arccos gn , a straightforward calculation reveals
d2τ(z,n)
dz2
= cos
arccos g
n
4p2g ′2 + n2(−1+ g2)(2pp′′ − p′2)
4n2(1− g2)p−pp + sin
arccos g
n
−pg g ′2 + (−1+ g2)(pg ′)′
n
p
1− g2(1− g2)p−p . (53)
We set n= 2 in the trigonometric functions and n= 3 elsewhere at which point (53) becomes the studied
expression (Eq. (52)) by virtue of (27). We multiply both summands by p
p−p(1 − g2) ≤ 0 and use
cos x2 =
q
1+cos x
2 (−pi≤ x ≤ pi) and sin x2 =
q
1−cos x
2 (0≤ x ≤ 2pi). We got the reverse inequality to prove
κ=
4
9
p2g ′2(1− 2g) + (−1+ g2)(1+ g)(2pp′′ − p′2) + 4
3
p(pg ′)′
≤ 0. (54)
For this purpose, we use Eq. (22) and deduce
κ=
1
p2

−ν4 + f3 12
√√ 3
−p

, (55)
where ν4 is given by (34) and
f3(q) = −27q2q′′ + q(−6pp′2 + 18q′2)− 4p2(pq′′ − 2p′q′). (56)
Since in Lemma 11 we proved ν4 > 0 we only have to show f3 ≤ 0 for κ≤ 0 to hold. The inequality f3 ≤ 0
does not hold in general, however. That is not a problem as long as we show that it holds for (ph′)′ ≤ 0.
First we assume γ≥ 0. By contrapositive of Proposition 14 (ii) we know
(ph′)′ ≤ 0⇒ g ≥ 0⇔ q ≤ 0. (57)
Hence we need to show q ≤ 0 ⇒ f3 ≤ 0. For q = 0 the function f3 becomes −4p2(pq′′ − 2p′q′) which
is proportional to ν2(z`)|q=0 (see (46)). Its relation to q was studied in Proposition 14 and we found
ν2(z`)|q=0 = q(z`) = 0 for z` given by (49). Therefore, f3(0)=0. Then, as demanded in (57), for any q < 0
we get f3(q) < 0 since Eq. (56) is an increasing function of q. This follows from q′′ = 6"z ≤ 0 (valid for
" ≤ 0) and −6pp′2 + 18q′2 ≥ 0 by looking at Eqs. (16) and (17). For γ < 0 we know from Lemma 4 that
g > 0 (q < 0) always holds independently on the sign of (ph′)′. Therefore f3 < 0 and the proof goes as
outlined above. 
Proposition 16. The function t0 is convex in z ∈ (0,1).
Proof. The function t0 is proportional to τ(z, 3) =
p−p cos arccos g3 and so we will focus on proving d
2τ(z,3)
dz2 ≥
0 given by (32) for n = 3. In Lemma 11 we presented a proof of nonnegativity of a fraction multiplying
cos arccos g3 . Both cos
arccos g
3 ≥ 0 and sin arccos g3 ≥ 0 for |g(z)| ≤ 1 and so d
2τ(z,3)
dz2 ≥ 0 holds whenever
(ph′)′ ≥ 0. For the rest of the proof assume (ph′)′ < 0. We will construct a lower bound on d2τ(z,3)dz2 and show
it to be nonnegative. To this end, we summon the inequalities sin hn > sin
h
n+1 and cos
h
n < cos
h
n+1 (valid for
n ≥ 2 and visible in Fig. 4 for n = 2,3) and substitute sin h3 and cos h3 by sin h2 and cos h2 , respectively. This
is a lower bound on d
2τ(z,3)
dz2 and the quantity was proved to be nonnegative in Lemma 15. This concludes
the proof. 
Remark. The fact that g 6< 0 for (ph′)′ ≤ 0 is crucial. First of all, it is not clear how to prove the validity
of d
2τ(z,3)
dz2 ≥ 0 given by (32) for (ph′)′ ≤ 0. But even the only manageable lower bound, Eq. (52), is in some
cases not good enough (i.e., non-negative) for g < 0 and (ph′)′ ≤ 0.
Corollary 17. The function t2 is concave in z ∈ (0,1).
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Proof. Similarly to Proposition 7 we will make use of t2(p,q) = −t0(p,−q). The mapping q 7→ −q changes
the sign of g, g ′ and h′ (see Eqs. (22), (24) and (27)). Looking at Eq. (32), we notice that for n ≥ 2 the
sign of the trigonometric functions remains unaffected (see Fig. 4 for n= 2,3). Similarly for the expression
from Lemma 11 coming from (32). The sign change of q also swaps the sign of (ph′)′ in (32). This is
because (ph′)′ = p′h′ + ph′′ together with
h′′ = − g g ′2 + (1− g2)g ′′
(1− g2)3/2
taking into account that g ′′ changes the sign upon q 7→ −q. But both cases ((ph′)′ ≥ 0 and (ph′)′ < 0) have
been separately investigated in Proposition 16. So we conclude t ′′0 (p,−q)≥ 0 and so t ′′2 (p,q)≤ 0. 
Lemma 18. Let (ui)2i=0 be a probability distribution function and h3 the ternary Shannon entropy defined
in (1). Then h3 is concave in (0,1) × (0,1) ⊂ R2 and for a fixed u2 ∈ (0,1) the function h3 is monotone
increasing (decreasing) for u1 < (1− u2)/2 (u1 > (1− u2)/2).
Proof. The Hessian matrix
H(h3(~u)) =
− 11−u1−u2 − 1u1 − 11−u1−u2− 11−u1−u2 − 11−u1−u2 − 1u2

(58)
is negative definite since TrH < 0 and detH = 1/(u0u1) + 1/(u0u2) + 1/(u1u2) > 0. The concavity of h3
follows from the positivity of the characteristic polynomial throughout the interval (u0,u1) ∈ (0,1)× (0,1).
We now fix the value of u2 and the equation ∂ h3/∂ u1 = 0 is satisfied for u1 = (1 − u2)/2. Thanks to
the previously proved concavity, it is a local maximum for every u2 ∈ (0,1) and thus (1− u2)/2 defines a
one-parameter family of local maxima for h3. 
Remark. Due to the symmetry between u2 and u1 in (1) we may fix u1 and get a family of local maxima
given by −2u2 + 1. The global maximum of h3 at (u2,u1) = (1/3,1/3) lies in the intersection of (1− u2)/2
and −2u2 + 1. The situation is illustrated in Fig. 5.
Theorem 19. The von Neumann entropy H($) of density matrix (10) is a concave function of the overlap z
as introduced in (14), for all pk and for all 0≤ ϑ ≤ pi/2 corresponding to " ≤ 0 in (17e).
Proof. The von Neumann entropy H($) is given by h3(~x(z)) in (1) where xk = tk+1/3 come from Eq. (18).
Taking into account
∑2
i=0 x i = 1 we get ~x : R 7→ R2 and the investigated expression d
2h3
dz2 will be written
using the following notation: We define
x′ =

x ′1
x ′2

(59a)
x′′ =

x ′′1
x ′′2

(59b)
and
h′3 =

∂ h3
∂ x1
∂ h3
∂ x2

. (60)
Using the chain rule, the second derivative can be succinctly expressed as
d2h3
dz2
= (x′)>H(h3(~x))x′ + (h′3)>x′′, (61)
where> denotes transposition and the dot (matrix) product is implied. Hessian Eq. (58) is negative definite
according to Lemma 18 and so the first summand is negative for any x′. In order for the second summand
to be nonpositive as well, one possibility is when either the functions x1 and x2 are concave and the two
components of h3 nondecreasing or x1, x2 convex and h3 entry-wise nonincreasing. We proved x
′′
2 ≤ 0 in
Corollary 17 but said nothing about the concavity of x1. As a matter of fact, it is incomparably more difficult
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Figure 5. The ternary Shannon entropy Eq. (1) is shown. The blue line depicts u1 =
(1− u2)/2 while the green one is the plot of u1 = −2u2 + 1.
to prove x ′′1 ≤ 0 in spite of the overwhelming numerical evidence. The same numerics suggests that there
is a whole class of input probabilities pk for which x
′′
1 = 0. So no ‘simple’ bounds like those leading to
Proposition 16 exist. But there is a third possibility of how to make the second summand in (61) negative
and it is the combination of the two previous cases. We know that x ′′0 ≥ 0 from Proposition 16 and x ′′2 ≤ 0
from Corollary 17. The second summand (61) will be negative if we take x0 instead of x1 in Eqs. (59)
and (60) and show ∂ h3∂ x0 ≤ 0 and ∂ h3∂ x2 ≥ 0. Note that the Hessian remains negative definite:
H(h3(~x)) =
− 11−x0−x2 − 1x0 − 11−x0−x2− 11−x0−x2 − 11−x0−x2 − 1x2

. (62)
Hence, in spite of the components of x′ to have different signs (see Propositions 6 and 7), the summand is
negative. Also note that we are proving the properties of the same ternary entropy (1) since it is equivalent
to
h3(~x(z)) = −x0 log x0 − x2 log x2 − (1− x0 − x2) log [1− x0 − x2]. (63)
Lemma 18 informs us that ∂ h3∂ x2 ≥ 0 and x ′′2 ≤ 0 together with ∂ h3∂ x0 ≤ 0 and x ′′0 ≥ 0 is satisfied in the domain’s
subset delimited by the blue line (x0 ≥ (1− x2)/2) and the green line (x0 ≤ −2x2+1) depicted in Fig. 5 if
instead of u2,u1 we have x2, x0 (resulting in the same figure). But it turns out that this is precisely the range
of ~x represented by x0, x2. To this end, consider the basic property of the cubic roots [29] t0 ≥ t1 ≥ t2 that
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becomes x0 ≥ x1 ≥ x2 ≥ 0 for the eigenvalues of$. First, using x0 ≥ x1 we write
x0 ≥ x0 + x12
=
x0 + x1 + x2 − x2
2
=
1− x2
2
, (64)
where in the second row we used the normalization condition
∑
i x i = 1. The last equality leads to one of
the desired bounds. For the second bound we start with x1 ≥ x2 to write
x0 ≤ x0 − x2 + x1
= −2x2 + x0 + x1 + x2
= −2x2 + 1, (65)
where the last line provides the other inequality we were looking for. Hence (h′3)>x′′ ≤ 0 resulting in
d2h3
dz2 ≤ 0. 
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